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Abstract
The overlap between virtue epistemology and the philosophy of education has been
dominated by discussions of the epistemic qualities of good learners, that is, the intellectual virtues that must be nurtured in students. Not much has been said about the epistemic qualities of good teachers expressed in virtue-theoretic terms. This paper offers a
preliminary account of such qualities, which are designated as pedagogical virtues. I use
Battaly’s pluralist conception of intellectual virtue as a starting point, then describe a
pedagogical virtue as an intellectual virtue with an other-regarding success or motivational
component. I end with an elucidation of the pedagogical versions of two mainstream
intellectual virtues, perseverance and inquisitiveness.
Keywords: virtue epistemology; philosophy of education; intellectual virtues; perseverance; inquisitiveness

1. Introduction
The overlap between virtue epistemology and philosophy of education has been dominated by discussions on developing the intellectual virtues of students.1 Baehr (2013:
249) claims that “fostering growth in intellectual virtues should be a central educational
aim”, and virtue epistemologists have written about why and how certain intellectual
virtues must be taught to our students.2 Not much has been said, however, about intellectual virtues that teachers must cultivate in themselves.
Kawall (2002) proposes that if the goal of intellectual virtues is the epistemic flourishing of an agent – whether through the acquisition of epistemic goods (such as knowledge and understanding) and cognitive skills, or through intellectual character
development – there is no reason to limit our list of virtues to only those that achieve
this goal for oneself. In other words, he suggests that an epistemic agent may also be
considered intellectually virtuous if she has qualities that lead to other epistemic agents’
1

Two anthologies of important works on this overlap are Kotzee (2014) and Baehr (2016). A more recent
article (Curren 2019) also focuses on this intersection.
2
Some intellectual virtues argued to be ideally cultivated in students are inquisitiveness (Watson 2016b),
intellectual humility (Roberts 2016), open-mindedness, and insightfulness (Riggs 2016).
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
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flourishing, and these qualities are what he calls “other-regarding” intellectual virtues.
In particular, Kawall talks about the teacher as a virtuous epistemic agent:
consider the case of an excellent teacher who is able to communicate a love of
knowledge to her students, and whose students almost always become engaged
with the subject matter she teaches. Further, her students acquire a great deal of
knowledge. There is a strong intuition that she is being a good epistemic agent,
even if she is not merely concentrating on acquiring knowledge for herself. She
is helping to create knowledgeable, engaged agents within her community. The
pursuit of truth in her community will likely be more successful for her efforts.
Her teaching contributes to a surplus of true beliefs over false beliefs; but
among her students and community, not just herself. Recognition of otherregarding epistemic virtues would allow us to see such a teacher as a good epistemic agent. (Kawall 2002: 271)
Note that a teacher might be considered a good epistemic agent if she is characteristically
competent and motivated to seek epistemic goods, but unless she could also lead her
students towards truth, she could not be considered a good teacher. In this paper, I propose an account of the intellectual virtues of a good teacher, which will be designated as
“pedagogical virtues”.
I begin with a clarification of the concept of intellectual virtue in the next section,
where I express reliabilist and responsibilist virtues in terms of success and motivational
components. In section 3, I explain the success and motivational components of pedagogical virtues to come up with an account of this concept. Then I discuss pedagogical
versions of perseverance (section 4) and inquisitiveness (section 5) as concrete examples
of pedagogical virtues, before concluding with some clarifications of my account.
2. The concept of intellectual virtue
Since pedagogical virtues are a kind of intellectual virtue, we must first clarify the concept of “intellectual virtue.” Virtue epistemologists define intellectual virtues in two distinct ways: virtue reliabilists (Sosa 1991; Greco 1993) consider them to be reliable
truth-conducive faculties that makes the subject attain more good beliefs than false
ones, while virtue responsibilists (Code 1984; Montmarquet 1987; Zagzebski 1996;
Roberts and Wood 2007; Baehr 2011) consider them to be stable character traits that
dispose subjects to be motivated in seeking knowledge and other epistemic goods.
Without privileging one account over another, I use Heather Battaly’s (2001, 2008,
2015) insights into the concept of intellectual virtue so that we could come up with
a comprehensive and inclusive account.
Battaly (2001) argues that intellectual virtue is a thin/vague concept, meaning there
is no consensus on which conditions are necessary for what counts as an “intellectual
virtue”.3 Every virtue epistemologist would agree that intellectual virtues are a kind of
(1) cognitive excellence, manifested through a (2) stable disposition having to do with
truth,4 but they would disagree on the other features associated with the concept of
intellectual virtue. Zagzebski (1996) highlights two other key elements of intellectual
virtues: (3) the motivational component, which is “a disposition to have … an emotion
See also Alston’s (1964) discussion of “vague concepts” in Battaly’s (2001) argument.
See Battaly (2001: 112; 2008: 644–52; 2015: 19–20).

3
4
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that initiates and directs action to produce an end with certain desired features” (1996:
136), and (4) the success component, which is “being reliable at bringing about the end
that is the aim of the motivational component” (1996: 136).5 Virtue reliabilists such as
Sosa (1991) and Greco (1993) consider only the success component to be necessary for
intellectual virtues, while other virtue responsibilists such as Montmarquet (1987) and
Baehr (2011) require only the motivational component. All these different notions,
according to Battaly (2001: 113), “are all equally correct and equally arbitrary.
Consequently, our concept of intellectual virtue is too thin to make any of these projected disagreements meaningful”.
Endorsing a thin/vague concept of intellectual virtue allows us to have a more inclusive, pluralist theory of virtues. Reliabilists and responsibilists agree that (1) and (2) are
necessary for intellectual virtues, but generally disagree about which between (3) and
(4) are also required. Battaly (2015) proposes a disjunctive characterization of intellectual virtues, because the excellence of epistemic agents could manifest either through
qualities that enable us to be successful in attaining good effects (4), or through qualities
that give us good motives that guide our intellectual practice (3). This characterization
also emphasizes how reliabilist and responsibilist intellectual virtues are complementary: the former reliably produce true beliefs without necessarily involving good motivations, while the latter require truth-oriented motivations without necessarily
producing true beliefs (Battaly 2016: 164, 170).
I intend to use this concept of intellectual virtue derived from Battaly’s disjunctive
view: an excellent, stable disposition that either helps us attain epistemic goods, or characteristically motivates our actions towards epistemic goods. In other words, an intellectual virtue is a cognitive excellence that has either a success component or a
motivational component or both, with respect to attaining epistemic goods. Since pedagogical virtues are intellectual virtues, it seems reasonable to expect that such virtues
follow such a disjunctive model. In the next session, I discuss how the success and
motivational components of pedagogical virtues are cashed out.
3. Other-regarding success and motivational components
Pedagogical virtues are intellectual virtues insofar as they are excellences oriented
towards epistemic goods and intellectual flourishing, but they aim for students’ flourishing, rather than one’s own. To use Kawall’s vocabulary, pedagogical virtues are otherregarding intellectual virtues. This orientation helps us describe what the success and
motivational components for pedagogical virtues look like.
3.1. Success component
The success component emphasized in mainstream reliabilist virtues is a disposition
towards reliably attaining true beliefs, rather than a matter of raw success. To use a
familiar Gettier-style example, Henry, who passes by the barn façade county
(Goldman 1976: 772–3; Plantinga 1993: 33), is deprived of knowledge because he is
in an epistemically hostile environment where his belief that the object he was looking
5
Battaly (2001: 112) enumerates more commonly disputed characteristics of intellectual virtues, such as
whether it is a character trait, an intellectual skill, an acquired habit, among others. I emphasized only the
success and motivational components, because these are the crucial contestable features, and the others will
follow once either component (or both) has been established.
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at is a barn is not safe. In that instance, he was unsuccessful in attaining knowledge, but
that instance alone does not immediately make him an unreliable believer. After all, he
has excellent eyesight that makes him inclined to form true visual beliefs, which makes
us say that Henry has virtuous vision, despite not getting it right all the time. On the
other hand, an almost blind Ernie who often correctly distinguishes real barns from
fake barns in barn facade counties but does so out of incredible luck rather than
through visual competence, has a good success record but cannot be said to have a reliable disposition for forming visual beliefs.
Similarly, the success record of a teacher does not necessarily indicate pedagogical
virtue. Consider Gilderoy Lockhart, the incompetent Defence Against the Dark Arts
professor in Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets (Rowling 1999a). His career is
decorated with achievements and awards for things he never did, and the texts he
assigns for class are works about these fraudulent achievements, including an autobiography. His students barely learned anything, apart from perhaps Hermione Granger, the
ever-diligent student who read Lockhart’s autobiography and got a perfect score in his
exam. Setting aside the question of what students must learn (which lies more in the
subject matter than in the career of the professor), suppose Lockhart was lucky enough
to always get Hermione Grangers for his students, diligent students who study whatever
their professor asked of them and brilliant enough to absorb all the material that he
gives. If excellent teaching is only a matter of successfully inducing some learning in
students, then Lucky Lockhart would be a virtuous teacher. Conversely, suppose
Remus Lupin, arguably the best professor the Hogwarts students ever had (Rowling
1999b), happened to have only terrible students throughout his career, and despite
his best efforts, he is unable to induce learning in the majority of his students. If
good teaching equals raw success, then Unlucky Lupin would be an unvirtuous teacher,
but this result does not seem right. However, if we posit counterfactually that they be
given the same set of students (which Lockhart and Lupin were in the series, albeit
in two different year levels), the difference between their dispositional qualities towards
teaching is expected to manifest how much more students will learn in Lupin’s class
than in Lockhart’s class.
Additionally, the intellectual virtues that emphasize the success component are
mostly reliable cognitive abilities, which could function properly only in a particular
set of environments.6 For instance, our visual belief-forming capacities can only be reliable within an epistemically friendly environment. We cannot reasonably expect Henry
to reliably form true beliefs about which barn is real and which barn is fake while in the
barn façade county, since that is not a conducive environment for his barn-recognition
competence. Similarly, one might propose that pedagogical virtues have a corresponding “normal” environment that is conducive to their exercise, which may include the
overall qualities of the students (brightness, attention span, willingness to engage, interest in subject, etc.), their access to well-maintained facilities and learning materials, the
physical condition of the classroom, among other things. Adding these kinds of parameters is appealing because it does seem too strong to require success-oriented pedagogical virtues to be effective in all possible learning environments. It seems
reasonable not to expect so much from teachers working in harsh learning environments, such as having 100 students from a low socioeconomic background in a cramped
classroom, with barely half of whom having a textbook.
6
The environment a subject is in is one of the parameters in Sosa’s (1991: 284) definition of intellectual
virtue.
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However, we must not suppose that the learning environment has the final word
regarding pedagogical success. We can expect a virtuous teacher to be able to engage
even her most timid students and spark their interest in the content despite not
being initially interested, and even to work around the scarcity of learning materials
so that her students could learn. This capacity of a teacher to induce learning even
in harsh learning environments speaks to the excellence of the teacher, and so is a
mark of pedagogical virtue. Identifying a comprehensive list of “normal” conditions
that are conducive for teaching and learning is a complex empirical question and is
beyond the scope of this paper. The upshot here is that while sub-optimal conditions
can limit the exercise of success-based pedagogical virtues, a virtuous teacher is not
entirely at the mercy of the learning environment; rather, she can effectively respond
to the limitations of her environment in order to reliably induce her students’ learning.7
3.2. Motivational component
Dispositional success in bringing about learning is one way of cashing out the otherregarding excellence of a pedagogical virtue. Having the proper motivation towards
teaching is another. The motivational component of mainstream intellectual virtues
towards truth, sometimes called “love of knowledge”, is usually explained in contrast
to other dispositions such as having unvirtuous reasons for knowing such as prestige
(of which Lockhart is a good example) and wealth, indifference to relevant truths,
and perverse concern to know what is unworthy (such as gossip) (Roberts and
Wood 2007: 168–80). Similarly, one might teach without genuine concern for the learning of the students, and do it for reputational status, promotion, a better salary, and
power over the students.
But how would we positively describe the other-regarding motivational component
of a pedagogical virtue? Suppose Sheldon is a teacher who almost never lies to his students because he values truth and is firmly bound by a sense of duty to share the truth
to others, and also thinks that he becomes a better epistemic agent by doing so. If he
recites a litany of facts about string theory to a class of sixth-graders, he is sincere in
telling truths about science and wanting his students to know these truths. But wanting
other people to know truths based on his sense of duty may not necessarily coincide
with wanting the students to learn. While Sheldon’s truth-telling disposition in his
class might be considered a pedagogical virtue if it reliably leads to the students’ learning (though this is very unlikely in this particular example) – if it has an other-regarding
success component – its motivational component does not seem to be characteristically
pedagogical.8
In contrast, consider Stella, a devoutly Christian fourth-grade teacher who believes
that creationism is true and that evolution is false.9 However, she does recognize the
scientific evidence for evolution, and admits that her belief in creationism is based
on faith rather than science. Given this, she does not intend to impose her religious
beliefs on anyone else, especially her fourth-grade students, and she acknowledges
how important it is for her students to learn the best results of scientific research. If
she asserts “Modern-day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus”, to her students
7

Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for making this significant point.
This shows that a virtue might have an other-regarding success component but a self-regarding motivational component.
9
This example is due to Lackey (2008: 48).
8
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despite not believing the statement, it seems that she is motivated by her students’
acquisition of knowledge (despite not agreeing that it is knowledge), rather than sharing
what she believes in.10 If this motivation to impart information (whether she believes it
or not) is a stable epistemic disposition, that is, a disposition towards her students’
acquisition of epistemic goods, then it could also be considered virtuous.
It is important to qualify that “learning” here must be understood in an “externalist”
way. That is, what matters is learning as a matter of fact, rather than what the teacher
takes to be learning.11 Using the latter, “internalist” conception can have undesirable
implications for the motivational component of our account. Suppose Stella is still
genuinely concerned for her students’ learning and that she has epistemic dispositions
guided by this motivation, but what she considers “learning” is believing and following
what the Christian Bible says literally. Thus, her students would be learning according
to Stella’s notion of learning but may not necessarily be learning as a matter of fact.
Likewise, recall Lockhart above, for whom “learning” is a matter of the students recognizing his fake achievements. He could also be genuinely concerned for his students’
learning but his problematic concept of learning keeps us from considering him to
be virtuous. Establishing what “learning” as a matter of fact means is beyond the
scope of this paper, but this is what the teacher must be genuinely concerned about
rather than her personal conception of “learning”, in order for her dispositions to
count as having a motivational component.
From this, I propose the following preliminary account of pedagogical virtues:
A pedagogical virtue is an excellent cognitive disposition of a teacher that either
helps the teacher reliably produce successful learning in students (in normal learning environments) or characteristically motivates the teacher towards this goal.
While other-regardingness is not explicitly stated in this account, it is implied in how
the success and motivational components are defined in terms of the learning of students – these are two specific ways by which pedagogical virtues are other-regarding.
Note also that “learning” is used here to accommodate different epistemic and educational aims that may not be limited to acquisition of knowledge and understanding.12
Having a preliminary account of what pedagogical virtues are, let us consider concrete examples. In the next two sections, I consider two mainstream intellectual virtues
and look at their pedagogical virtue analogues.
4. Pedagogical perseverance
One can summarize both Nathan King’s (2014, 2019) and Battaly’s (2017) analysis of
intellectual perseverance in terms of a disposition to appropriately respond to obstacles to
one’s worthwhile intellectual goals out of love of epistemic goods.13 Three elements are
10
I am using this example quite differently from Lackey’s (2008) point, which is that Stella is a reliable
testifier despite being an unreliable believer. In other words, her concern is the success component, and this
just shows that Stella’s disposition to inform her students about scientific results is a reliable (i.e.
success-oriented) other-regarding virtue. But my intention in using this example is to suggest that she
also has an other-regarding epistemic motivation in her actions.
11
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for requesting clarification on this important distinction.
12
Robertson (2009) and Watson (2016a) offer good surveys of different epistemic aims of education.
13
Both accounts distinguish “intellectual perseverance” from “intellectually virtuous perseverance”,
where the former is a generic character trait and the latter is an intellectual virtue. In the characterization
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important here: (a) an appropriate response to obstacles, (b) the consideration of worthwhile intellectual goals, and (c) an epistemic motivation. I consider each of these briefly
before discussing what I take to be the pedagogical version of this virtue.
First, an appropriate response to obstacles mostly involves sticking with intellectual
projects for an appropriate amount of time, with respect to the value of the intellectual
goals being sought. King and Battaly locate this virtue in between vices of giving up too
early on one’s intellectual projects (“irresolution” or “capitulation”) and giving up too
late or not at all (“intransigence” or “recalcitrance”). We normally contrast perseverance
with giving up too early, like a first-year graduate student who gives up on academe
once she receives critical comments on her writing. However, Chidi Anagonye of the
TV series The Good Place, who wrote a 3000-page dissertation trying to answer every
philosophical question there is, does not seem to be an exemplar of virtuous perseverance either, since he did not recognize that his project is not worthwhile and doable.
Both agents here spent an inappropriate time on their respective projects, and so
responded inappropriately to their respective obstacles.
It is important to note that obstacles are person-relative and that this affects what
counts as perseverance. “What is difficult for one agent may not be difficult for
another”, writes King (2019: 261), and so what elicits perseverance for one might not
elicit perseverance for another. Writing a 1000-word exposition of Aristotle’s virtue theory might be tough for a student learning it for the first time but not for a professor who
specialized in Aristotle, and so the student might need to persevere in writing the exposition, whereas the professor does not need to.
Second, one must consider the quality and value of the intellectual goals being pursued. Someone counting the grains of sands in Bondi beach might encounter obstacles
to acquire knowledge about the number of grains there, but such serious effort is hardly
virtuous because that knowledge is trivial and unimportant. Finally, one’s response to
obstacles must be guided by a love of epistemic goods, rather than only personal status,
wealth, and other goods external to intellectual projects. One could exert serious effort
into finding a cure for cancer, which is definitely a worthwhile intellectual goal, but do
so with the sole intent to get rich once one succeeds, but we would hesitate to call this
person virtuously persevering.
As with most analyses of intellectual virtues, King’s early account (2014) focused
mostly on self-regarding manifestations of perseverance. Among his examples were
Helen Keller’s persistence to learn language despite her blindness, and Tycho Brahe’s
painstaking efforts to make careful and precise observations of planetary motion in
an attempt to synthesize the Copernican heliocentric system with the Aristotelian doctrine of circular orbits, which included building his own observatories and instruments
capable of extreme precision as well as spending decades to gather data. King (2019)
expands his account of intellectual perseverance by specifying “intellectual projects”
in terms of acquiring, maintaining, or disseminating epistemic goods. While the
above examples are mostly instances of acquiring epistemic goods, note that disseminating epistemic goods is particularly other-regarding. A good model of other-regarding
perseverance would be Helen Keller’s teacher, Anne Sullivan.

here, I have included three important things that qualify perseverance as an intellectual virtue: the response
to obstacles must be appropriate, the intellectual goals must be worthwhile, and the actions must be epistemically motivated. With this account, I use “intellectual perseverance” to designate the intellectual virtue
without having to distinguish it from the broader, non-virtuous character trait.
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Sullivan taught Keller how objects have names by spelling the letters on Keller’s
hand as she touches these objects. In Keller’s (1940) autobiography, Story of My Life,
she described one of the attempts of Sullivan to teach her some words:
Earlier in the day we had had a tussle over the words “m-u-g” and “w-a-t-e-r.”
Miss Sullivan had tried to impress it upon me that “m-u-g” is mug and
“w-a-t-e-r” is water, but I persisted in confounding the two. In despair she had
dropped the subject for the time, only to renew it at the first opportunity.
(Keller 1940: 27–8)
This episode might now be familiar to many as an inspiring story of how a blind girl
learned words, and eventually how to read and write. But Sullivan also manifested intellectual perseverance, but in disseminating, rather than acquiring, epistemic goods. In other
words, while Keller’s perseverance was self-regarding, Sullivan’s was other-regarding.
Taking King’s and Battaly’s accounts as a starting point, we can describe otherregarding perseverance, or more specifically, pedagogical perseverance, as a disposition
to appropriately respond to obstacles in helping one’s students acquire epistemic goods
out of a desire for their epistemic flourishing. Here we specified helping students learn
as the worthwhile intellectual goal (b), but the appropriate response (a) and epistemic
motivation (c) are similar to the more general account. First, Sullivan had to endure
Keller’s struggles in comprehending the distinction between mug and water during
that time, and had she absolutely given up teaching her the distinction by then, she
would have been irresolute. However, she also decided to drop the matter for the meantime, recognizing that any more insistence on teaching the same thing without trying
anything different would be intransigent. In other words, she persisted with teaching
Keller for the appropriate amount of time vis-à-vis the obstacle of teaching. Second,
we could also infer from Keller and Sullivan’s often-told story that Sullivan struggled
teaching Keller out of a desire for Keller to learn and not out of non-epistemic
motivations.
The obstacles that elicit pedagogical perseverance are also person-relative, which
includes both the teacher and her students. Teaching is already a challenging task
but there are factors that could make this endeavour much more difficult. It is much
tougher for, say, Raj, a stuttering and socially awkward teacher, to deliver a lecture
than Leonard, who is eloquent and friendly, granting that their familiarity with the
topic is equal. This would mean that Raj needs to exert a lot more effort in lecturing
than Leonard, which makes Raj more admirable. Similarly, we marvel at Sullivan’s perseverance in teaching a blind student how objects have names, but she might have
encountered less difficulty if she were teaching someone who was not blind, and she
might not even have needed to persevere at all. This does not necessarily mean that
teaching language to students with sight does not elicit perseverance, only that this is
less admirable than Sullivan’s resistance to greater obstacles.
I end this section by discussing how pedagogical perseverance is a pedagogical virtue, according to the account proposed in section 3. It is easy to see that it has an otherregarding motivational component which is explicit in our characterization above (“out
of a desire for their epistemic flourishing”). A teacher who genuinely cares for her students’ learning is ready to struggle through various obstacles to this goal. This is sufficient to satisfy our disjunctive account of pedagogical virtue. Yet, one might wonder
whether pedagogical perseverance also has an other-regarding success component,
that is, does it reliably produce successful learning in students?
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Looking at King’s and Battaly’s accounts of mainstream perseverance, one might be
tempted to think that it does not have a success component. King (2019: 261) says that
“Virtuous resistance to difficulty does not require success in achieving one’s intellectual
goals”. This is because success depends on factors beyond one’s serious effort; e.g.
nobody has succeeded in finding the cure for Alzheimer’s not because nobody is persevering to, but because of the immense difficulty of the project. In such cases, one can
still have intellectual perseverance by trying (but failing) to overcome extremely difficult
obstacles, knowing that the potential epistemic rewards if one succeeded are significantly worthwhile (Battaly 2017: 674). However, recall that the success component of
intellectual virtues is not reducible to raw success, nor does it guarantee that a virtuous
epistemic agent would never fail to gain knowledge. Instead, what matters is that the
agent is reliable in attaining epistemic goods. Insofar as intellectual perseverance
involves a “disposition to make good judgments … about which intellectual goals are
appropriate for one to pursue, and when” (Battaly 2017: 678, her emphasis) and a
rational belief that the success of a project is a live possibility (King 2019: 263), then
an agent with this virtue is less likely to spend an inordinate amount on time on worthless or hopeless intellectual projects, and more likely to overcome obstacles in worthwhile endeavours.
These remarks can be applied to the account of pedagogical perseverance.
A teacher with this disposition should be capable of making good judgments about
her students’ capacity to overcome obstacles to learning. She does not give up easily
on her slower students, but she also recognizes when to give her students more time
(recall Sullivan). Pedagogical perseverance does not guarantee that all her students
will excel in learning, but it makes her more reliable in inducing learning in many of
her students, especially those who encounter significant difficulties. This shows that
pedagogical perseverance has not only an other-regarding motivational component
but also an other-regarding success component, which strengthens its status as a
pedagogical virtue.
5. Pedagogical versions of inquisitiveness
Lani Watson (2015: 279) defines an inquisitive person to be “characteristically motivated to engage sincerely in good questioning.” Inquisitiveness, in her account, has
both a success component (one must ask good questions) and a motivational component (one must be asking sincerely in the interest of epistemic goods). However,
Watson’s (2016b) emphasis on the relation between inquisitiveness and learning, especially for young children, suggests that inquisitiveness is a self-regarding virtue; inquisitive people typically ask questions to gain knowledge and understanding for oneself.
What, then, would an other-regarding version of inquisitiveness look like?
If students (or learners in general) ask questions to seek knowledge for themselves,
then a teacher who answers those questions (1) such that the askers reliably learn from
these answers, and/or (2) out of a desire for the students to learn exhibits an otherregarding pedagogical virtue. A teacher might also ask questions out of the same motivation and/or produce similarly successful results. For lack of a term in natural English,
these question-answering and question-asking dispositions of a teacher, insofar as they
are characteristically motivated by and reliably connected to students’ learning, are
pedagogical versions of inquisitiveness. However, neither of these two could be called
“inquisitiveness”, which means that these are different virtues altogether. This will be
made clearer as I elaborate on these virtues in what follows.
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5.1. Question-answering virtue
Students usually ask questions to their teachers about something they do not know or
understand.14 Consider first what kind of answer a teacher should give to questions with
straightforward, non-controversial answers. Recall Sheldon, the teacher bound by his
sense of duty to almost always tell the truth. Suppose he asked his sixth-grade students
to compute the circumference of a circle (up to two decimal places) and one of his students, Penny, who knows the formula but does not know what value of π to use (or
probably forgot what it was), asks him this question:

Penny: Teacher, what is the value of π?
Sheldon: Three-point-one-four-one-five-nine-two-six-five-three-five and so on.
While Sheldon’s answer is factual, it does not seem that he answered Penny’s question
well, much less excellently. First, he did not understand what exactly Penny was asking,
or why she asked that question. She was interested in what value of π to use to solve one
particular problem, so she did not need that many digits of π to do that. As a result,
Penny might not even have followed Sheldon’s answer at all, in which case Sheldon
was not able to help her learn. If he tends to answer these kinds of questions in this
way, then his question-answering disposition does not have a reliable other-regarding
success component. Additionally, he was not answering the question out of a desire
for Penny to learn, but he does so, ex hypothesi, out of wanting to tell the unqualified
truth. A teacher who has a question-asking disposition guided by an other-regarding
motivation would have considered what the student needs to know in order to learn,
and would have answered “3.14”, even if it is not strictly speaking a precise answer.15
Apart from what answer/s a teacher gives, it is also important to consider how she
answers the students’ questions, especially when students are asking more difficult and
open-ended questions. For instance, smarter students might ask questions about advanced
topics which their classmates might not understand. A good teacher would have to try satisfying the smart student’s curiosity (she might not need to answer the question comprehensively) without marginalizing the majority of the class who cannot appreciate their
exchange. A different case would be a student asking a culturally or gender-insensitive
question during a class discussion. A good teacher would have to manifest the sensitivity
that her student did not, but also have to explain to the student why her question might be
misplaced without embarrassing her, especially if the student did not have malicious
intent. The teacher could do any of the following: answering the question through a minilecture, answering it partially to tease the students’ curiosity, responding with a question to
the student, postponing the answer for a latter class session, and even not answering the
question at all – each of which might be appropriate in some situations but not in others.
A teacher with a question-answering virtue would be motivated by and sensitive to the

14
For this discussion, let us set aside higher-level questions where students try to apply and extrapolate
their understanding of the lecture (e.g. “Would Wittgenstein have considered fake news as a languagegame?”) or try to challenge or develop the ideas they have understood (e.g. “Doesn’t this theory fail to consider X?”). We can also exclude cases in which students ask questions out of non-epistemic motivations,
such as challenging their teachers or showing off to their peers. But these cases must be considered in a
more comprehensive account of virtuous question-answering for teachers, which deserves treatment in a
separate paper.
15
Elgin (2007) argues that most of what teachers teach is not factually true, but close enough to the truth
so that the students develop an understanding of the subject matter.
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students’ learning – both the asker’s and her classmates’ – in figuring out the appropriate
response to her students’ questions.
5.2. Virtuous pedagogical questioning
A second counterpart of inquisitiveness would be a question-asking virtue specific to
the type of questions that teachers ask. Watson (2015) considers good questioning to
be the defining factor of inquisitiveness. However, consider teachers who ask good
questions during discussions to encourage students to think critically instead of spoonfeeding them, or teachers who design what could be considered a good exam consisting
of questions that students must answer. These teachers might have a disposition to
“engage sincerely in good questioning” but it seems inappropriate to describe them
as “inquisitive”. Why so?
I argue that the issue here lies in the kind of questions being asked. Most questions
are information-seeking (Watson 2018b): seeking something implies that one does not
have what is being sought yet (or at least, one believes so), and we see this in most questions where the questioner seeks information that she does not know yet (call these
“Common Questions”). The teacher could very well ask Common Questions to her students (e.g. “What do you mean by this sentence?” or “Do you have an example that
illustrates this claim?”), but most of the questions that teachers ask have answers that
they know already. This might be why, elsewhere, Watson (2018a: 357) proposes
more broadly that the goal of questions is to elicit information, since one could elicit
answers that she already knows (whereas “seek”, “gather”, and “acquire” suggests that
the questioner does not have the information yet). This nuance importantly qualifies
the kind of questions that inquisitive persons are asking, namely, Common
Questions. We could therefore amend Watson’s account: an inquisitive person is one
who is characteristically motivated to engage sincerely in good questioning in seeking
epistemic goods that she lacks. Watson (2019) suggests this herself, albeit implicitly,
when she defines curiosity as having a “[characteristic motivation] to acquire worthwhile epistemic goods that she lacks, or believes that she lacks” (2019: 159), and
describes inquisitiveness as “curiosity manifested as good questioning” (2019: 161).
In other words, asking questions about things that she already knows or understands
does not make a person inquisitive. This is why we do not usually attach inquisitiveness
to teachers even if they tend to ask a lot of questions.
Let us call the teacher’s question-asking virtue “virtuous pedagogical questioning”.
While teachers ask questions in the classrooms and examinations, not all pedagogical
questioning is virtuous. Picking up from Watson’s account of inquisitiveness, I suggest
the following account:

A teacher’s pedagogical questioning is virtuous if the teacher has a disposition to
ask good questions that contribute reliably to the student’s learning and/or is characteristically motivated to ask such questions for the sake of student’s learning.
There are some things we need to note in this account. First, for the teacher to have a
question-asking virtue, it must be a disposition; having one or even a few isolated
instances of competent and/or appropriately motivated questioning is not
sufficient to make it an excellent cognitive disposition. Second, I am employing the
disjunctive account of pedagogical virtue proposed in section 3 here; the pedagogical
questioning disposition may be virtuous by a success component or motivational
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component.16 Third, note that the types of questions here are left unspecified. Some of
the questions that the teacher tends to ask might be Common Questions, and insofar as
asking these questions leads to reliable success in or is motivated by the students’ learning, then the students’ question-asking disposition could be virtuous. What is left to be
considered is what constitutes the success and motivational components of pedagogical
questioning. I spend some time to discuss good pedagogical questioning, and end with a
few remarks on sincere pedagogical questioning.
First, consider good questioning in general. Recall that Watson (2018a) defines questions as information-eliciting acts, and from this she proposes that good questioning is
acting competently in order to elicit worthwhile information. This competence manifests in judgments about not only what question(s) to ask, but also whom, where,
when, and how to ask them such that the appropriate information is elicited. Asking
the wrong question, asking the wrong person, or asking at the wrong time or place
are examples of incompetent questioning. Additionally, good questioning attempts to
elicit worthwhile information, that is, information relevant to the questioner’s aims.
For instance, a doctor asking her new patient’s favourite songs while diagnosing her
condition does not exercise good questioning (assuming the patient’s music tastes are
irrelevant to her condition). Finally, a competent questioning skill does not always
translate to successfully eliciting the target information, since the latter may depend
on factors beyond the questioner’s control (recall that Henry’s bad luck in being in
barn facade county does not take away his visual competence).
Now, let us consider what makes for a good pedagogical questioning. We have mentioned that most questions that the teacher asks are not Common Questions; in other
words, teachers tend to ask questions whose answers they already know. Consider first
what we could call “Discussion Questions”, which are usually used during lectures and
discussions as thinking prompts for students. This would include literal questions that
have specific answers and trigger memorization, inferential questions that challenge the
students to process the given information and develop their own reasoning, and metacognitive questions that call for the students’ reflection on their own thinking (Fusco
2012: 15–18). In asking these questions, the teacher elicits information not for her
own epistemic needs, but for her students’ (Watson 2018a: 360–1). Thus, while
Common Questions are good insofar as the questioner is competent in eliciting the
information she needs, Discussion Questions are good insofar as the questioner
(teacher) is competent in eliciting the information needed by the questioned, in this
case the students. This involves a disposition to have good judgment about what information is worthwhile for the students, which questions would best elicit this information, which questions are appropriate for the current epistemic competence of the
students, among others. The widely influential Bloom’s taxonomy (Bloom 1956) is a
helpful guide for teachers in identifying the specific cognitive skills that they want students to learn, and designing questions appropriate for developing these skills.
Next, consider what we could call “Assessment Questions”, the questions asked in
formal (exam questions) and informal assessment (those asked during recaps of class
discussions to check whether students are following). Like Discussion Questions, the
teacher likely knows the answer to these questions, especially if she was the one who

16
I need not commit to a stronger position that the teacher’s question-asking virtue, like Watson’s
inquisitiveness, must have both a success and motivational component, although this position might be
defended in a separate paper.
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made the exam or designed the past lectures.17 But note that the teacher also learns
something from the students’ capacity (or lack of capacity) in answering these questions, namely, the extent of the students’ mastery (or perhaps more modestly, memory)
of the content. This qualifies what counts as good Assessment Questioning. In designing which information to elicit from her students, the teacher has to make judgments
about the extent to which she could adequately assess her students’ level of understanding based on their answers. An exam that is too easy or too difficult might not be considered a good exam, since it does not provide the teacher with useful and precise
information about her students’ performance, in addition to challenging their students
too little or too much. A virtuous questioner (as far as Assessment Questions are concerned) not only knows how to formulate good formal assessment questions,18 but also
to spontaneously use informal assessment questions in the classroom to competently
obtain information about their students’ learning progress.
Note that Assessment and Discussion Questions need not be mutually exclusive.
Sometimes, questions designed for assessment, such as short essay-type questions, activate the students’ cognitive skills as they discuss their answers in written format, and
questions designed to tickle the students’ critical thinking in class also shows the teacher
which students are on which level of understanding. The purpose of distinguishing
between these questions is not to come up with a taxonomy of different kinds of questions asked by the teacher, but to distinguish how a teacher elicits information using
these questions from how a typical person elicits information through Common
Questions. This distinction serves to highlight how the success component of pedagogical questioning might be described.
Whichever the type of question is being used, the teacher’s pedagogical questioning
disposition can also be virtuous by being characteristically epistemically motivated.
Consider a teacher asking good questions that are too difficult for the students to answer
just so she could show off her own knowledge and feel good about herself, or a teacher
asking good questions to students whom she perceives not to be prepared enough for
those questions since she likes embarrassing her students in front of their peers. These
are just two examples of insincerely asking good questions. In contrast, a virtuous
teacher would ask good questions with sincerity, where sincerity is understood in
terms of a desire for the student to learn. She asks these questions for the sake of students’ learning and epistemic flourishing.
6. Final clarifications
I end this paper with some clarifications. This account of pedagogical virtues is not
meant to be some sort of Aristotelian definition that signifies the essence of pedagogical
17
The teacher might not necessarily know the answers to all Discussion and Assessment Questions.
Consider higher-level and open-ended questions such a “Do you agree or disagree with how this theory
addresses the problem? And why?” which can have a wide range of different possible responses, some of
which the teacher cannot anticipate even given her knowledge of the content. Two points remain here
though: the teacher asking these good questions still does not seem to be “inquisitive”, and the purpose
for asking these questions – and the standard by which we evaluate whether these questions are good –
is to elicit the students’ thinking so that they learn well. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for requesting
clarification on this point.
18
The educational literature is rich with discussions on what makes assessment questions good. Shilo
(2015) and Fuhrman (2018) are recent papers on good essay questions and good multiple choice questions,
respectively.
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virtues by distinguishing it from other intellectual (but “non-pedagogical”) virtues.
Rather, it aims to identify the conditions under which intellectual virtues may become
pedagogical, that is, how they contribute to the goal of teaching. This attention to the
manifestation of virtues in teaching does not involve a claim that these virtues are only
possessed by teachers.
To clarify, let us revisit Sosa’s (1991) concept of virtue as something’s excellence in
fulfilling its function. A knife is virtuous if it can cut what it is supposed to cut (bread,
meat, vegetables) well. So does the teacher have pedagogical virtues when they teach
excellently. However, that the sharpness of a knife makes it a virtuous knife does not
mean that sharpness is a quality that only knives have. Most fish bones are sharp,
but it would be absurd to say that fish bones are virtuous because they are sharp,
just because this property makes knives virtuous. Similarly, people other than teachers
can possess the qualities that we call pedagogical virtues, but perhaps we cannot call
them pedagogical virtues because these dispositions do not manifest in a pedagogical
setting.
The upshot is that intellectual virtues may have role-specific manifestations, and
what I described in this paper are the pedagogical manifestations of intellectual virtues.
While I focused on the role of these intellectual virtues in teaching, it does not mean
that this role is all there is to such intellectual virtues.19
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